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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION REGULATION
OF DOMESTIC COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS:
A COMPETITIVE REFORMATION
INTRODUCrION
Croesus, King of Lydia, when in doubt as to national policy some
2,500 years ago sent his ambassadors to Delphi to catechize the Oracle
of Apollo. The Pythian priestess who delivered the oracles uttered the
words "Croesus, having crossed the Halys, will destroy a great em-
pire."1 Croesus blindly accepted this response as meaning that he
would destroy the Persian Empire. He thereupon immediately launched
a full-scale campaign across the Halys, resulting in his defeat and
capture.
Contemporary society, much like Croesus, but with far more relia-
ble results, also queries a superinformation source-the computer.
Within the past twenty years, the computer has matured from a labora-
tory curiosity to the world's fastest growing industry.2 We have entered
the Second Industrial Revolution where the labor of the human brain
is both implemented and replaced by the computer.3 As early as 1964,
Martin Greenberger predicted that
[C]omputing services and establishments will begin to spread through-
out every sector of American life, reaching into homes, offices, class-
rooms, laboratories and businesses of all kinds.4
1. H. PARKE, A HISTORY OF THE DELPHIC ORACLE 151 (1939).
2. See, e.g., H. SACKMIAN, COMPUTERS, SYSTEM SCIENCE AND EVOLVING SOCIETY
29 (1967). The growth of computer installations has been phenomenal as indicated
by the table below.
Growth of Computer Installations and Cumulative Computer Investment
Costs in the United States
Cost-Billions
Year Total Installation of Dollars
1945 1 -
1955 1000 .7
1965 30,000 7.8
1975 85,000 (estimate) 31.5
Id. The table has been edited for clarity.
3. J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE 13 (1968); K. STEHLING,
COMPUTERS AND You: THEIR APPLICATION TO SOCIETY at ix (1972).
4. Greenberger, The Computers of Tomorrow, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1964,
at 63.
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Today computers are being used for writing music and poetry, diag-
nosing the ills of patients, directing space vehicles, reapportioning vot-
ing districts, finding the law, analyzing and predicting judicial deci-
sions, and for numerous other purposes. It has been suggested that we
will see in the near future- a new monetary system wherein each indi-
vidual will be identified by a universal credit card or "money key"
which will replace both the check and most normal currency as a
medium of exchange.6 All transactions, from the simple purchase of
groceries to the complex preparation of detailed corporate tax state-
ments, may become a matter of automatic electronic transfer of in-
formation within the memory banks of a computer. It is also believed
that the totality of the world's knowledge can be deposited in a com-
puter's memory banks and then be made available on demand. Out of
this availability will flow wide-ranging opportunities for human de-
velopment and social change that may well alter contemporary society
almost beyond recognition.7
As the computer is a device which has had and will continue to
have profound effects upon the body politic, its utility raises a germane
issue as to whether it should be governmentally controlled. This paper
will attempt to analyze the nature of contemporary computer regula-
tion, which has been entrusted to the FCC. More particularly, it will
delineate how the impact of recent technological advances has caused
the Commission to rethink its traditional natural monopoly rationale
in favor of a procompetitive approach in the telecommunications field.
I. THE ADVENT OF TME-SHARING
In 1954, the first computer designed for commercial use, the
"Univac I," was delivered to General Electric.8 This "analytical en-
5. Lawlor, Law and Society: Where Do We Go From Here, PRAc. LAW., Mar.
1967, at 10, 11.
6. D. PARKHILL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY 157-60 (1966);
R. SPRAGUE, INFORMATION UTILITIES 56-69 (1969); Greenberger, Banking and the
Information Utility, 14 COMPUTERS & AUTOMATION, April 1965, at 28-29. See generally
Baxendale, Commercial Banking and the Checkless Society, 1 RUTOERS J. COMPUTERS
& L., Fall 1970, at 88; Kramer & Livingston, Cashing in on the Checkless Society, 45
HARv. Bus. REv. 141 (1967); cf. White, The Case for a Check!ull Society, 16 Bus.
AUTOMATION, Aug. 1969, at 46.
7. D. PARKHILL, supra note 6, at 172.
8. J. BERNSTEIN, THE ANALYTICAL ENGINE: COMPUTERS, PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 51 (1963). For a history of the four stages of computer development see Zani
& Zani, Towards the Computer Utility: Evolution or Revolution, 15 DATAMATION, Oct.
1969, at 125.
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gine" and its progeny for the next several years were in-house, free-
standing devices. 9 Generally, their utility was restricted to the isolated
plant or office where they were installed. During the late 1960's a
momentous event transpired. Computers became linked with communi-
cation services, thereby extending their potential usefulness to the
general populace on a shared basis.10 The impetus for the marriage
between computers and communications came from both industries.
The computer itself is a giant communications system with
complex switching techniques. As the power and utilization of com-
puters increased, it was only natural to connect the internal communi-
cations circuits of the computer to existing external communications
circuits and thus provide wide geographic dispersion to the capabilities
of a computer.
Within the communications industry, the sheer growth in message
volume . . .required increasingly sophisticated control mechanisms.
The computer was the natural choice. 1
This symbiotic relationship between computers and communications
seems irresistible. It is estimated that more than sixty percent of the
computers used in the United States will be tied into the public
communications systems by 1975, and as much as ninety percent by
1984.12
Today's computer system has three basic components: the com-
puter unit; user terminal equipment; and communication lines con-
necting the two.' 3 The terminal-a mechanism by which computer
9. The Stanford Research Institute indicates that only one percent of all com-
puters sold during 1965 were connected to any kind of data communications system.
See COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS: TOWARD A COMPUTER UTILITY 64 (F. Gruen-
berger ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS].
10. In 1967 time-sharing constituted a $50 million market; by 1968 it had climbed
to $180 million; and by 1972 it was expected to rise to nine hundred million dollars.
In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 298 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Computer Tentative Decision].
11. Dorff, Computers and Communications: Complementing Technologies, 18 Coms-
PUTERS & AUTOMATION, May 1969, at 22.
12. Note, Computer Services and the Federal Regulation of Communications, 116
U. PA. L. REv. 328 (1967). See also COMPUTERS AND COMM1UNICATIONS, supra note 9,
at 13, stating: "[I]t appears likely that by 1980 there will be few free standing com-
puters. Nearly all computers will be embedded in and integrated with the com-
munications systems."
13. During 1969, several companies began producing minicomputers ranging
in cost from $3,000 to over $100,000. This development has made it possible to use
them directly without communication lines in homes, offices, on board ships and air-
craft, and in a variety of other situations. Of course, they do not take the place of
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information is received and supplied-ranges in complexity from the
simple teletypewriter to the highly complex visual display devices. The
Touch Tone Telephone is perhaps the most common, permitting a
user to transmit digital information over ordinary telephone lines
and receive a voice response.
The communications linkage most widely used is the common
carrier line, although alternative microwave and satellite systems are
being developed and have great promise of becoming prevalent in the
future. A microwave radio system can be constructed along any trans-
mission route with relay stations being installed every twenty to
thirty miles. The cost of such an enterprise would be relatively mini-
mal compared with the expense of laying cable. Data transmission
via domestic satellite provides a second alternative to the traditional
terrestrial cable lines, with the cost of such communications being
nearly independent of distance once the system is operational.
Such a combination of computers and communications may pro-
vide us with the means of establishing a national computer utility,
with computer consoles in every home,14 on an Orwellian model. It
is predicted that by the end of this decade data communications will
exceed voice communications and the volume of communications among
computers will exceed that among humans. 15
II. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The primary source of regulation in the domestic computer-com-
munications industry has been congressional acts, which generally have
terminals of major computer systems that can handle greater magnitudes of data.
K. STE LING, supra note 3, at 299. See generally Hinricks, The Impact of Mini.
computers on Industry, 18 COMPUTERS & AUTOMATION, Dec. 1969, at 28; Kluchman,
Minicomputers on the Move, id. at 24; Schmedel, Compact Computers, Wall Street
J., Aug 11, 1969, at 1, col. 1; The Minis Are Moving, 17 Bus. AUTOMATION, Feb.
1970, at 46; Zack, Minicomputer Applications-Do They Imply Something for Every-
body?, 18 COMPUTERS & AUTOMATION, Dec. 1969, at 36.
14. COMPUTERS AND COIMuUNICATIONS, supra note 9, at 1. See also Davidson,
Access to a Computer for Every Person-A Prediction, 18 COMPUTERS & AUTOMA-
TION, Mar. 1969, at 13; Greenberger, supra note 4, at 67. Barring unforeseen obstacles,
an on-line interactive computer service provided commercially by an information utility
may well be as commonplace by 2000 A.D. as the telephone service is today. Id.
15. Nolan, Moving Business Data is Big Business, 1 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L.,
Fall 1970, at 2, 4. The number of data terminals installed in the United States during
1970 was about 185,000 and by 1974 the figure is anticipated to reach 820,000. The
number of data transmissions will jump from an estimated 14.3 billion in 1970 through
47.8 billion in 1974 and hit 248 billion by the decade's conclusion. Id.
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been adopted with other objectives in mind.16 These include: the
Federal Communications Act of 1934;17 the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962;18 and a triumvirate of antitrust statutes-the Sherman
Antitrust Act,19 the Clayton Antitrust Act,20 and the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. 21
A. The Federal Communications Act of 1934
This statute created the Federal Communications Commission
which was charged with "regulating interstate and foreign commerce
in communication by wire and radio .... "22 Essentially, the Act was
intended to regulate the fledgling radio industry,23 although the lan-
guage used was broad in scope and capable of application to a host of
other activities. The Commission was given responsibility for super-
vising schedules of charges filed with it, for licensing new entrants, and
for issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity on the ex-
tension of existing lines.24 The agency can execute these functions by
formulating policy either legislatively through rule-making or judically
through adjudication. Rule-making has been defined as the "process
for formulating, amending or repealing a rule."25 It entails publication
in the Federal Register of a general notice of the proposed rule and
a subsequent agency hearing in which all interested persons are
given an opportunity to participate through the submission of written
data, views, or arguments. 26 Frequently the agency will issue a tenta-
tive decision which is open to comment by interested parties, enabl-
ing an informed final decision to be rendered.
16. But see The Automatic Data Processing Equipment Act of 1965, 40 U.S.C.
§ 759 (1970) (often called the Brooks Bill). This statute was designed to provide for
the economical and efficient purchase, lease, maintenance, operation, and utilization of
automatic data processing equipment by the United States governmental agencies
and departments.
17. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Communications Act].
18. 47 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Satellite Act].
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1970).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 660, 3285, 3691; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52,
53 (1970).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1970).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
23. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); ABC v.
FCC, 191 F.2d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Massachusetts Universalist Convention v.
Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1950); Black River Valley Broad-
casts v. McNinch, 101 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
24. 47 U.S.C. §§ 203-05, 214 (1970).
25. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1970).
26. Id. § 553(b), (c).
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Adjudication, on the other hand, has been denoted as the "agency
process for formulation of an order,"2 7 and typically involves an ad-
versary hearing to resolve a dispute routinely handled by the agency.
28
Each party is given the opportunity to submit its facts and arguments
before a hearing examiner, whose decision, absent an appeal, becomes
the decision of the agency without further proceedings.
Congress has conferred on the United States Courts of Appeals
jurisdiction to review only the final orders of the Commission. An
order is final where a party is aggrieved or adversely affected by a de-
termination of the agency or where the order denies a right or imposes
an obligation.29 The task of the Court of Appeals in reviewing an
action of the FCC is limited to determining whether the Commission
has fairly exercised its discretion within the "vaguish penumbral
bounds" expressed in the Act, and the courts will not overrule a
decision unless it is arbitrary as a matter of law.30 It is not at all un-
common for an appellate court in an adjudicative proceeding to re-
verse where the result has seemed to it unsatisfactory; but the agency's
judgment regarding rule-making has seldom been disturbed. 1
Congress, in addition to legislation, has used a variety of subtle
techniques to regulate FCC decisions.8 2 Standing committees which
subpoena the Federal Communications Commissioners for testimony
have a significant impact on agency determinations. During the Ninety-
First Congress, over twenty-five committees and subcommittees at-
tempted to oversee virtually every aspect of the FCC's activities.88
The Executive Department also exerts an acute influence over
27. Id. § 551(7).
28. Id. § 554(b), (c).
29. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1970); United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1956); Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC,
243 F.2d 829, 832-33 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
30. FCC v. RGA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953).
31. Ford, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 63 W. VA. L. REv. 25, 34-35 (1960). See also Collins, judicial Review of
FCC Decisions, 1968-1969, 23 FED. Com. B.J. 57 (1969). During the period from June
1, 1968, through July 15, 1969, the Commission was affirmed sixteen times and re-
versed nine times. Id.
32. Krasnow, The Ninety-First Congress and the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 24 FED. Com. B.J. 97, 104 (1971).
33. Id. at 103. Other subtle ways of congressional control over the Federal Com-
munications Commissioners includes a legislative fixing of their tenure and the re-
quirement of Senate confirmation of appointments to the Agency. Further, the Commis-
sion is required to submit an annual report to Congress concerning its activities for the
purposes of an appraisement of the volume, quality, and character of the agency's ac-
complishments. See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 154(a), (g), (k) (1970).
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agency determinations. The President of the United States has the
duty to appoint the seven Federal Communications Commissioners.
34
Additionally, the chief executive has, in the past, authorized the crea-
tion of various task forces to study particular communication problem
areas, and has invested these groups with power to make recommenda-
tions to the Commission.35 In 1970, President Nixon created an agency
in the Executive Department, known as the Office of Telecommunica-
tions Policy, which has been given the function of supervising over-
all national communications matters. 36 This new office was not in-
tended to usurp the prerogatives or functions assigned to the FCC
by Congress, and it was believed that the new department and the
Commission would cooperate in achieving reforms in the telecom-
munications field.
37
B. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962
This second major piece of legislation was designed
to establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with other coun-
tries, as expeditiously as practicable a commercial communications
satellite system, as part of an improved global communications
network .... 38
This Act created a uniquely structured private corporation, known as
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), owned half by
the general public and half by the overseas carriers.39 COMSAT has
been viewed as a "carrier's carrier": a wholesaler of international satel-
34. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970).
35. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, FINAL RE-
PORT (1968) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
36. See President, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1970, H.R. Doc. No. 222, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970). This plan was submitted to Congress and became law when
neither house voted to disapprove it. 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1970).
37. Exec. Order No. 11556, 3 C.F.R. 956 (1970). For a positive view that the
Office of Telecommunications Policy was needed, see Doyle, Do We Really Need a
Federal Department of Telecommunications?, 21 FED. Cort. B.J. 3 (1967). But see
Spievack, Presidential Assault on Telecommunications, 23 FED. COM. B.J. 155 (1969).
This movement seems to portend a clear intent by the executive branch to have primary
responsibility for both national telecommunications policies and federal administrative
telecommunications operations. Such a department would be an "improper political
encroachment upon the independence of regulatory responsibilities," as the Commis-
sion would be easily overwhelmed by the power, prestige and influence of the President.
Id. at 157, 162.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
39. Id. §§ 731, 733. COMSAT has 15 directors on its board, three appointed by
the President, six on the carriers side, and six on the public side. Id. § 733(a).
953
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lite circuits to the conventional carriers.40 The Act further stated it
did not "preclude the use" of communications services if required in
the national interest.41 In sum, the statute instituted a scheme for the
regulation of international telecommunications satellites, while it left
the domesic satellite issue to be resolved at a later date.
C. The Antitrust Acts
The third type of regulatory legislation consists of a progression
of antitrust statutes designed principally to regulate monopolies and
prevent undue concentration of industry. The Sherman Act, a relic
from the Roosevelt trust-busting era, was aimed at destroying monopo-
lies by outlawing every business contract, combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade.42 The Clayton Act of 1914 marked an attempt
by the government to strengthen the Sherman Act by declaring illegal
specific practices of big business that tended "to lessen competition"
or "create a monopoly. '43 It is presumed that the FCC enjoys the full
reach of these statutes in proscribing tying agreements or exclusive
dealing arrangements in the telecommunications field.4 4 The Robinson-
Patman Act rounds out the trio of antitrust statutes by making price
discrimination unlawful in the purchase of commodities of like grade
and quality.
45
III. THE HARBINGER OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
A. The Participants
At present there are three groups of competitors vying for control
of the data processing field. The first faction, the computer industry,
is intrinsically separated into two basic areas-hardware and software.
40. In re Authorized Entities & Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d 421, 425 (1966).
For a very good discussion concerning the merits of the satellite legislation, see Schwartz,
Comsat, the Carriers, and the Earth Stations: Some Problems with "Melding Variegated
Interests," 76 YALE L.J. 441 (1967).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1970).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
43. Id. § 18.
44. Irwin & McKee, Vertical Integration and the Communication Equipment
Industry: Alternatives for Public Policy, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 472 (1968) [here-
after cited as Irwin]. A tying agreement, within the prohibition of the Clayton Act, in-
volves a sale of two or more commodities on the condition that all must be purchased
or none will be sold. Hence, it coerces the buyer to purchase the tied-in commodity in
order to secure the desired one.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
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The hardware segment includes the manufacture of the machines them-
selves, their component parts, and related peripheral equipment. 46
This sector is under the suzerainty of International Business Machine
(IBM) which accounts for approximately seventy percent of the hard-
ware output.47 IBM has built more than ten times as many computers
as its nearest competitor.48 To eliminate a threat from the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division, IBM entered into a consent decree
in 1956, requiring it to transfer its time-sharing subscriber services to
an independently operated subsidiary.49 Despite this decree and other
pending public and private antitrust suits,5 0 IBM's growth has not
been stunted and its stranglehold on the computer hardware field re-
mains intact.51 A dozen other competitors have thrived by entering
46. Davison, Babcock & Leshy, Computers and Federal Regulation, 21 AD. LAw
REv. 287, 302 (1969).
47. See, e.g., K. STEHLING, supra note 3, at 286.
COMPUTER INDUSTRY LEADERS
1969
Hardware Installed Shipments Software-1969 Sales
0/0 % Millions of Dollars
IBM 70.5 69.2 35 IBM
UNIVAC 6.7 5.6 26 Computer Sciences
Honeywell 4.2 4.7 17 Planning Research Corp.
CDC 4.1 3.6 14 Computing & Software
RCA 3.6 3.2 13.5 Computer Applications
Burroughs 3.2 4.2 12.5 Control Data
GE 4.0 4.0 11 Leasco
NCR 2.4 2.7 10.8 Informatics
XDS 0.8 1.0 10.7 Computer Usage
DEC 0.2 0.8 35.3 Nine Large Others
Others 0.3 1.0 74.2 Systems Development
190 900 Small Concerns
100.0 100.0 450
Id.
48. Penn, The Computer Game, Wall Street J., Nov. 22, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
49. United States v. IBM, 1956 Trade Cas. 68, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), amended,
Civil No. 72-344 (S.D.N.Y. 1963 and 1970).
50. See B. GILCHRIST & M. WESSEL, GOVERNMIENT REGULATION OF THE COM-
PUTER INDUSTRY 168 n.203 (1972), listing over a dozen antitrust suits, most of which
are pending against IBM.
51. Burck, The "cAssault" On the Fortress I.B.M., FORTUNE, June 1964, at 113.
But cf. How Big Is Too Big?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 3. For proposals
to establish a public commission to consider the breakup of IBM see Memorex
Officers Propose a Breakup Study of IBM, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1971, at 69, col. 6;
Memorex Proposes Public Panel to Alter Computer Industry, Wall Street J., Nov. 4,
1971, at 15.
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into specialized hardware areas where IBM has chosen not to mass its
resources.
52
The software subdivision of the industry can be defined as every-
thing other than the hardware. Principally it consists of the program
which directs the computer's activities. This sphere is essentially com-
petitive in character, with many smaller firms having their share of the
market. During the late 1960's, several hardware manufacturers offered
a single price for the entire unit, thus tying the purchase of hardware
to software. Such "free software" foreclosed competition in that sector
as it was impossible to compete in the marketplace against a zero dollar
price. 53 The Justice Department's Antitrust Division and a number of
private software firms filed several antitrust suits which resulted in sub-
stantial unbundling in the hardware division, and an accompanying
increase in price to the consumer.
A second contingent of competitors is manifest in the service
bureau industry, which consists of an active group of organizations
which performs data processing on a fee or contract basis. These firms
lease or buy computer hardware and in turn sell time on a shared basis
to their subscribers. It is estimated that in 1972 there were more than
eight hundred service bureaus in the United States offering data process-
ing services, and that sales reached 1.2 billion dollars to some one hun-
dred thousand customers.55 IBM's wholly owned subsidiary is by far
the largest service bureau, with National Cash Register and Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph's Data Service Division among the
larger competitors.5 6
An offshoot of the service bureau industry, consisting of a group
of specialized subscription services, was recently conceived as a result of
the interconnection of computers and communications. These organi-
zations cater to the particular needs of the various segments of the
business world and offer, for example, legal, medical, credit, or stock
52. Kleiman, The Economic Promise of Computer Time Sharing, 18 COMaPUT-RS
& AUTOMATION, Oct. 1969, at 47, 49.
53. Jacobs, Computer Technology (Hardware and Software): Some Legal Im-
plications for Antitrust, Copyrights, and Patents, 1 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L.,
Fall 1970, at 50, 64-65.
54. See Drattell, Unbundling: The User Will Pay for the Works, 16 Bus. AUTO-
MATION, Aug. 1969, at 36; Pantages, A Look at Unbundling, 15 DATAAATION, June
1969, at 85; The Supersonic Seventies, 17 Bus. AUTOMATION, Jan. 1970, at 44, 64.
55, Computer Tentative Decision, supra note 10, at 297.
56. C. BARNETT, JR. & ASSOCIATES, THE FUTURE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY 30
(1967) [hereinafter cited as C. BARNETT].
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quotation services. It has been suggested that these hybrid services are
forming a new type of business quite distinguishable from either the
computer field or the communications industry.
5 7
The third and final entrant in the time-sharing enterprise con-
sists of the communications common carriers. Traditionally, all com-
munications requirements have been met by the authorized carriers-
the Bell System and the Western Union Telegraph Company. The
Bell System includes American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T), twenty-four Bell operating companies, the Western Electric
Company, and Bell Telephone Laboratories. 58 Most of the Bell operat-
ing companies are wholly owned by AT&T, and offer communications
services in a particular state or region. The Western Electric Company
is the manufacturing affiliate, and supplies virtually all of the equip-
ment used in the Bell System. The Bell Telephone Laboratories repre-
sents the research arm of the system.
Bell operates under a consent decree which prohibits it from of-
fering non-communication services.5 9 Its affiliated companies supply
eighty-four percent of the local exchange telephone market, but cover
only fifteen percent of the geographical area of the United States.60 The
remaining market, encompassing eighty-five percent of the land area
of the United States, is served by some 1,800 independent or non-Bell
Telephone companies. For example, General Telephone and Elec-
tronics Systems, the largest independent, renders telephone service to
some fifty percent of the non-Bell market, while United Utility, the
second largest non-Bell system, supplies fourteen percent of the inde-
pendent market.61 In the narrowly defined message service telegraph
industry, the Western Union Telegraph Company (Western Union)
has had a complete monopoly since 1943.62
57, Hyde, The Role of Competition and Monopoly in the Communications In-
dustries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 899, 909 (1968).
58. Note, Regulation of Computer Communications, 7 HARV. J. LEols. 208 n.1
(1970).
59. United States v. Western Electric Co., 13 R.R. 2143, 1956 Trade Gas. 68,
246 (D.N.J. 1956). In this antitrust suit the Justice Department sought to divest Western
Electric from the Bell System and to require the operating companies to purchase all
equipment in a competitive market. The consent decree resulted, as the Justice Depart-
ment believed it could not win the case. See M. IRWiN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN-
DUSTRY: INTEGRATION VS. COMPETITION 50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS INDUSTRY].
60. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 25.
61. Id. at 26.
62. In that year Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.
§ 222 (1970)) to permit a merger of the Postal Telegraph & Cable System and the
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B. The Issues
An examination of the participants reveals that they function
under divergent economic philosophies. 63 The common carriers-the
telegraph and the telephone industries-are regulated monopolies
which are assigned franchised markets and fixed rates. The service
bureaus, and to some extent the computer hardware industry, display
varying degrees of competition, and their prime regulator is the force
of the market. The convergence of computers and communications
has made possible the offering of many new services in the gray area
between the two. As technology has blurred the traditional lines which
had formerly separated the industries, the question was posed whether
these hybrids were to be governed by the principle of monopoly or by
competition.
America has long been committed to the free enterprise system,
regulation being limited to those areas where a "natural monopoly"
existed, as in the utilities industries. During the late 1950's, the nat-
ural monopoly argument was so pervasive in these fields that one
commentator concluded:
It is of course elementary that the prevailing philosophy in this coun-
try is to have public utility services rendered by monopolies. This so
generally prevails that there would be no point in arguing for or
against it."4
The characteristics of a natural monopoly are threefold: (1) high
capital expenditure; (2) decreasing costs per unit; and (3) a public
convenience or necessity in the area regulated. 5 Economists rely on
the second criteria, in stating that a natural monopoly exists where
the lowest cost per widget can be satisfied by one firm.00 In such a rele-
Western Union Telegraph Company, with the latter emerging as the sole dominant
company. For legislative history, see Congressional Comments, U. S. CODE CONG.
SERv. 2.2 (1943).
63. Irwin, Computers and Communications: Public Policy at the Crossroads, I
RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L., Fall 1970, at 35.
64. Arnebergh, Public Utilities Regulation and the Community Interest, 30 S. CAL.
L. REV. 191 (1957).
65. For a more detailed analysis, see D. PARICHILL, supra note 6, at 145-48.
66. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMIcs 452 (8th ed. 1970):
Under persisting decreasing costs for the firms, one or a few of them will so ex-
pand their qs [widgets] as to become a significant part of the market for the
industrys total q [widgets]. We shall then end up with one of the follow-
ing three cases:
(1) a single monopolist who dominates the industry. (2) a few large
sellers who together dominate the industry and who will later be called
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vant market, if more than one firm exists, the others will dissipate
through a series of mergers or failures. Where such economies of scale
predominate, the forced imposition of a competitive structure would
prove a "costly and idle gesture." 67 Competition in these situations is
thus not a viable regulatory mechanism, and direct controls are neces-
sary to ensure economic performance. 68 Yet, it must be kept in mind
that the goals of regulation and competition are identical-efficiency,
progressiveness, reasonable prices, and satisfaction of diverse needs.69
The answer to the question whether "new data services operate
in the best interests of the public in a competitive environment or
should ...be brought under the same regulations and restraints as
communications utilities" 70 hinges on whether they function under de-
creasing costs, entail a heavy initial expenditure, and serve a vital pub-
lic convenience or necessity. Most commentators are of the opinion
that the broad range of diverse computer information services does
not satisfy the conditions for a natural monopoly,71 except perhaps for
a few specialized areas such as a national case law data bank or medical
information network.
7 2
The next critically important issue was whether the monopolist
should be permitted to lever his way into competitive markets. West-
ern Union began a program of large scale diversification into the data
processing industry during the early 1960's, under the strategy of de-
veloping a national information utility. It established a seventy-seven
"oligopolists." (3) some kind of imperfection of competition that, in either a
stable way or in connection with a series of intermittent price wars, represents
an important departure from the economists model of "perfect" competition
wherein no firm has any control over industry price.
See J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 14 (1961) which argues that
the declining cost segment is not necessary to justify a claim to natural monopoly status.
67. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1207, 1208 (1969).
68. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969).
69. Kestenbaum, The Limits of a Regulated Monopoly: Telephone Attachments,
Interconnections, and Use of Circuits, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 979, 983 (1969).
70. Hyde, supra note 57, at 908.
71. See P. BARAN, THE COMING COMPUTER UTILITY: LAISSEZ FAME, LICENSING
OR REGULATIONS? 8-9 (1967); C. BARNETT, supra note 56, at 81; Duggan, Computer
Communications and Competition: A Frenetic Farrago, 1 L. & COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY,
Aug. 1968, at 2, 5; Posner, supra note 68, at 642-43; Smith, The Interdependence of
Computer and Communications Services: A Question of Federal Regulation, 117 U.
PA. L. REv. 829, 857-59 (1969). See D. PARIHILL, supra note 6, at 148, stating:
"[T]he time has now arrived when it becomes possible to consider computer power to
be a likely candidate for admission to the public-utility club."
72. See Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE L. J.
1299, 1313-17 (1967) ; Smith, supra note 71, at 856.
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city hookup of Dunn and Bradstreet offices, in what promised to be a
nationwide credit information service. In a second venture, Western
Union provided computers and communications for the Law Research
Services, Inc. of New York in an attempt to develop a legal data bank.
78
The offering of a similar service by both a regulated carrier and
non-regulated service bureau creates unique problems.
It would seem that fairness and consistency require the Federal Com-
muications Commission regulation of all entities offering a particular
service or of none. For example there would be obvious discrimina-
tion if communication common carriers were required to file tariffs on
computer/communication services thereby restricting their pricing
practices and marketing efforts, while similar services by computer
manufacturers and service bureaus were left largely unregulated. 74
Furthermore, an entity straddling two markets could adopt a cost-
plus philosophy if permitted to pass unwarranted manufacturing ex-
penses into its utility base rate.75 Operating under a fixed rate of re-
turn, cross-subsidization from the regulated to the non-regulated ac-
tivity would enable a carrier to crush competition without injury to
itself.
The crucial third issue was whether the common carriers should
continue to be the sole provider of communications lines for the new
time-sharing entities. Over the past decade the cost of computers had
dropped about twenty-five percent per year, while the communica-
tions costs had remained relatively fixed. If this trend continues the
comunications component will become the dominent expense.1 This
consideration, in conjunction with the fact that voice telephone lines
have only a limited capacity to handle data,77 would make any superior
alternative communications system, such as microwave or domestic satel-
lites, a welcome addition in the computer world. Furthermore, carriers
operating in a dual capacity, offering lines to both themselves and their
competitors, might be tempted to engage in forms of direct or covert
discrimination.
73. C. BARNETT 64-75.
74. Smith, supra note 71, at 837.
75. Irwin, Vertical Integration and the Communications Industry: Separation of
Western Electric and AT&T, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 125-26 (1969); Irwin,
supra note 44, at 448.
76. Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Com-
munications Services, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., 369, 371 (1969).
77. Telephone bandwidths can transmit data at speeds of 2000 bits per second,
while microwave transmission speeds of 1.5 million bits per second are attainable.
COMMENTS
C. The Bunker-Ramo Dispute
The above issues came to a head in the Bunker-Ramo episode. The
Bunker-Ramo Corporation provided a stock quotation service, "Tele-
quote III," throughout the United States on lines provided by the
common carriers. In 1965, the company attempted to engraft a message-
switching function that would permit a broker to place buy and sell
orders with other brokers on the same lines that furnished the informa-
tion. The carriers stated collectively that such an additional service
poached too far into their traditional communications monopoly. They
exided the controversy by simply denying Bunker-Ramo access to the
necessary communications lines. Bunker-Ramo then filed a letter of
complaint with the FCC, charging that the routing of communications
between buyer and seller was not a communications service, as it
amounted to only two percent of the total offering. The impasse was
finally resolved when Bunker-Ramo withdrew its proposed message
offering and FCC petition.
78
Notwithstanding its refusal to lease lines to Bunker-Ramo, Western
Union filed a tariff before the Commission in 1967, in which it offered
to provide the identical service that it had denied to Bunker-Ramo. A
Bunker-Ramo objection was dismissed, 79 and the tariff was approved by
the Commission with the following caveat:
[S]ubstantial and different questions would be raised with respect to
the propriety of the tariff if there should be any broadening of the
SICOM offering . . . whereby [Western Union] would perform ...
noncommunications data processing as a part of the packaged SICOM
service.80
Thus, the carriers were permitted to offer this hybrid service ex-
clusively; however, the scope of their victory was quite limited-they
had won only a battle and not the war. The FCC decision has been
criticized,8' and indeed to this day, the substance of the Bunker-Ramo
question continues to plague the FCC.
82
78. See Duggan, supra note 71, at 7-8; TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 184-87;
Comment, Computer Services and the Federal Regulation of Communications, 116 U.
PA. L. REv. 328 passim (1967).
79. In re Western Union Tel. Co., 11 F.C.C.2d 1, 12-13 (1967). The FCC, in
denying the Bunker-Ramo petition to suspend the SICOM offering, specifically stated
that it was neither approving nor disapproving the tariff, and that its validity was sub-
ject to challenge upon the submission of a properly supported petition.
80. Id. at 12.
81. See, e.g., S. MATHISON & P. WALKER, COMPUTERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
IssuEs IN PUBLIC POLICY 75-79 (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. MATHISON].
82. Bunker-Ramo has filed a complaint with the Commission that it has suffered
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IV. THE COMPETITIVE REFORMATION AND THE
CARRIER COUNTER-REFORMATION
The Federal Communications Commission has come under "fre-
quent attacks for its passive performance and seeming willingness to
avoid controversy."83 A report in 1963 stated:
The Federal Communication[s] Commission presents a somewhat ex-
traordinary spectacle. Despite considerable technical excellence on the
part of its staff, the Commission has drifted, vacillated and stalled in
almost every major area. It seems incapable of policy planning, of
disposing within a reasonable period of time the business before it,
of fashioning procedures that are effective to deal with its problems.8 4
"No other federal agency has been the object of as much vilification
and prolonged investigation by Congress."8 5 The FCC has often been
accused of representing the interests it was supposed to be regulating, "
and indeed regulation has often been dubbed an exercise in frustra-
tion. These criticisms have lead to a variety of proposals to reshape
and reorganize the agency to meet the problems posed by the changing
technology.8 7
discriminatory treatment at the hands of Western Union in the installation, maintenance,
and repair of communications facilities, as that company has favored its own SICOM
customers. For recent developments, see In re The Bunker-Ramo Corp. v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 25 F.C.C.2d 691 (1970), Sequel Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 617 (1971),
petition for modification granted, 31 F.C.C.2d 449 (1971), petition for extension
granted, 33 F.C.C.2d 279 (1972).
83. Cox, The Federal Communications Commission, 11 B.C. IND. & Co. t. L. Rvv.
595, 687 (1970).
84. Marks, Revision of Structure and Functions of the Federal Communications
Commission, 18 FED. Core. B.J. 4 (1963).
85. Krasnow, supra note 32, at 101.
86. See, e.g., L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS 8-9 (1969); ECONOMIC REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT 107-08 (1970); Baker, The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice:
The Role of Competition in Regulated Industries, 11 B.C. IND. & Coza. L. REv. 571,
572 (1970).
[M]ost regulation is either very superficial or does what the regulated industry
really wants to be done anyway . . . . Moreover regulation has to a large
extent been taken over by personnel representing the thinking and interests
of those supposed to be regulated.
C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 129 (1970).
87. Proposals include a separation and assignment of the adjudicatory and admin-
istrative functions of the FCC to a Communications Court and a Communications Ad-
ministrator, respectively. See Marks, supra note 84, at 14; Letter from Newton N. Min-
now to President Kennedy, May 31, 1963, in 15 AD. L. REv. 146, 153 (1963). For pro-
posals to establish a new federal agency or executive branch department to handle the
related problem areas, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 9, at 27-29;
Bigelow, Some Legal and Regulatory Problems of Multiple Access Computer Networks,
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The impact of the rapid technological innovation during the past
decade has given the FCC an opportunity to reevaluate its former
practices. Through a series of adjudicative and rule-making proceedings,
the agency has drafted a procompetitive policy in the domestic tele-
communications industry.8 8 Its activities can roughly be divided into
two major denominations, the "old competition" and the "new compe-
tition," respectively referring to the dates of the decisions and the views
of the policy makers.
A. The Old Competition
This era commenced in 1959 when the FCC announced what has
become known as the Above 890 Decision. 9 This case was hailed as a
remarkable decision, and given the Commission's historical bias, one
that "may well determine the depth of competition" in the communica-
tion industry for several decades to come. 0 As has already been sug-
gested, computer data is capable of being transmitted via microwave
technology. Although the commercial use of microwave commenced
after World War II, its growth and application was singularly dependent
on the FCC and its allocation of microwave frequency bands for trans-
mission. The FCC had generally assigned frequencies only to communi-
cation carriers91 and government agencies92 until the mid-1950's, when
numerous corporations applied for licenses to operate their own micro-
wave systems. The Commission consolidated the applications and in the
Above 890 Decision announced its policy of broadening entry into
11 JURIMETRicS J. 47, 61 (1970); Bigelow, Legal & Security Issues Posed by Com-
puter Utility, 45 HARv. Bus REv. 150, 160-61 (1967).
For proposals to enact a new national telecommunications statute or amend the
Communications Act of 1934, see Rowe, Antitrust and Monopoly Policy in the Com-
munications Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 871, 872 (1968); Werner, A Lawyer Looks
at Our Communications Policy, 11 JURIMETRICS J. 81 passim (1970).
88. See pp. 966-82 infra.
89. In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Me., 27 F.C.C. 359
(1959) [hereinafter cited as the Above 890 Decision].
90. Irwin, The Communications Industry and the Policy of Competition, 14
BUFFALO L. REv. 256 (1964).
91. In 1948 the Bell System had 220 route miles of microwave in operation.
Herber, The Impact of Microwave On the Telephone Business, 70 PuB. UTIL. FORT.
214, 221 (1962).
By 1951 AT&T had spent more than $100 million in microwave relay facilities in
some 65 cities, and had complete control over the microwave market. Beelar, Cables in
the Sky and the Struggle for Their Control, 21 FED. Com. B.J. 26, 33 (1967).
92. For example, during the 1950's the Semiautomatic Ground Environment
(SAGE) System for continental air defense linking remote terminals to a central com-
puter, via microwave, was assigned a frequency.
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the private microwave field, over the objections of the traditional com-
mon carriers. The FCC proceeded to assign to each applicant a portion
of the radio spectrum, in the bands above 890 Millicycles, for trans-
mission purposes. While the agency granted the applications, it cyn-
ically reaffirmed its adherence to the natural monopoly thesis, stating:
We doubt that our proposed policy of liberalized licensing of private
communications systems will be economically destructive to Western
Union, or to the other segments of the common carrier industry, be-
cause, as a general rule, a common carrier should be able to furnish
a given quantum of like communication service more economically
and more efficiently than a member of the public who undertakes to
do the job himself. This is so because of the extent to which the com-
mon carrier utilizes its communications plant and operating person-
nel to serve, in common, a large number of users with a variety of
services, with the result that the cost per unit of service by the common
carrier should be materially below the cost per unit of service to a
private licensee whose facility is constructed, operated, and maintained
to meet the communication requirements of only that licensee.03
The FCC cited, in addition, several other arguments mitigating against
the large-scale entry by independent firms into the private microwave
field.9 4 Furthermore, the agency refused to permit several independent
users to share in the construction or use of a private system, stating
that such arrangements were not in the public interest.05 Thus while
the Commission seared an indelible scar on the natural monopoly
rationale by licensing an alternative means of transmission, it never-
theless publicly predicted that the traditional carriers would be able
to successfully maintain their position vis-Ai-vis their new competitors.
Other commentators, however, did not share the Commission's position.
The immediate result [of the Above 890 Decision] was the crea-
tion of a vast new "potential" for competition to the established com-
mon carriers....
Since microwave allows transmission of nonvoice communica-
tions as well as voice communications, the established telegraph
industry is as seriously threatened by the new competition . . . as is
the established telephone industry.96
93. In re Allocation of Frequencies In the Bands Above 890 Mc., petition for
reconsideration denied, 29 F.C.C. 825, 852 (1960). But cf. Irwin, supra note 90, at 266.
94. Chiefly, firms would be deterred from entry by the large initial investment re-
quired for construction of stations, and by the refusal of interconnection by the estab-
lished carriers.
95. 29 F.C.C. at 407-08.
96. Herber, supra note 91, at 219.
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By 1962, more than ten million dollars had been spent by competitors
in preference to services that could have been supplied by the Bell
Systems.
9 7
The traditional carriers also believed that as a result of the Above
890 Decision they faced a severe competitive challenge to their
monopoly power in the communications field, and thus launched an
inquisitional competitive counterattack. Their most puissant weapon
was "Telpak," a new offering of bulk service at rates which represented
a cost discount of up to eighty-five percent of their former charges.98
This tariff was filed with the Commission a few months after the Above
890 Decision, and automatically took effect since it was not explicitly
disapproved or suspended. 99 Another weapon in the Bell arsenal was
the Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS) offering. This service per-
mitted a customer to talk as often and as long as desired for a flat
monthly charge. A similar service, Wide Area Data Service (WADS),
in effect offered for data what the WATS offered for voice. In addition,
Bell began an innovative research campaign and developed a series
of dataphone services that would be offered over the regular telephone
network. The Western Union Telegraph Company similarly intro-
duced a telpak-type of communications offering and began to improve
and expand on its existing services.
Although Bell suffered some reversals at the Commission's pro-
ceedings,100 it nevertheless was extremely effective in countering the
private microwave competition.101 While over four hundred organiza-
tions employed private microwave, as of 1968 their total of 2.5 million
97. Id. at 220, quoting The Competition Squeeze, 38 THE OHIO BELL, June
1961, at 22.
98. See In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F.C.C. 370, 379 (1964), listing
Telpak reductions as follows:
Telpak A 12 voice grade channels 51% price cut
Telpak B 24 voice grade channels 64% price cut
Telpak C 60 voice grade channels 77% price cut
Telpak D 240 voice grade channels 85% price cut
99. Under the Communications Act, any new service or change in existing service
takes effect automatically following a statutory prohibition period of ninety days, unless
disapproved by the Commission. 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1970).
100. After conducting an inquiry into the Telpak offering, the Commission held
Telpak A and B unduly discriminatory and ordered them discontinued, while permitting
classifications C and D to remain in effect. In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F.C.C.
761 (1965). Other provisions of the WATS and WADS tariffs were also declared
invalid. See In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F.C.C. 475 (1965); In re American
Tel. & Tel. Co. 35 F.C.C. 149 (1963).
101. Irwin, supra note 90, at 269. See generally Herber, Telephone Industry Re-
action to Microwave Competition, 70 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 627 (1962).
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circuit miles was less than two percent of Bell's total of 150 million cir-
cuit miles.10 2 Hence, it again appeared that the common carriers had
been victorious in the age of the "old competition."
B. The New Competition
The seeds -of competition originally planted by the Above 890
Decision remained essentially dormant for the next several years. They
eventually flowered, however, in 1968, and have since flourished in a
series of four "new competition" landmark decisions that redesigned
the structure of the established carrier industries.
1. The Carterfone Decision. During the last half of the nineteenth
century the Bell System and Western Union enjoyed a pure duopoly
in their respective voice and digital communications fields under their
patents. 03 The expiration of the telephone handset patent in 1893
marked the beginning of the independent telephone industry.1'0 At
the height of the Darwinian struggle for survival, the numbers of Bell
and non-Bell stations were approximately equal. 10 5 However, by em-
ployment of various strategems, Bell was ultimately able to achieve
domination over the industry. One tactic used was the interconnec-
tion prohibition, or refusal to interconnect not only with strictly dup-
licating facilities, but also with companies in areas Bell had never
chosen to serve. Another combative policy was the foreign attachments
prohibition against non-Bell products being connected with its lines.
Long after the Bell victory, these tariffs remained an integral part of
the Bell philosophy. A modern version of the foreign attachments
tariff, operative in 1968, provided:
No equipment, apparatus, circuit or device not furnished by the
102. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 6, at 11-12.
103. The original Bell patents, filed in 1876 and 1877, were first offered to Western
Union for $100,000. The telegraph company rejected the offer, but later realized its
mistake and acquired rival patents. While litigation concerning the validity of the
patents was pending, a compromise agreement was reached in 1879. Western Union
acknowledged the validity of the Bell patents, withdrew from the telephone field, and
llcensed.its own patents to Bell. In turn, Bell agreed to stay out of the telegraph field,
and to reimburse Western Union for all royalties on Bell's patent. FCC, INVESTIOATION
OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th
Cong., lst Sess. 123 (1939).
104. Gabel, The Early Competitive Era In Telephone Communications 1893-1920,
34 LAW & CONTENIP. PROn. 340, 341 (1969); Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation-
The Silent Crisis, 34 LAw & CONTEMIP. PROB. 299, 304 (1969).
105. In 1907 the independents owned 3 million stations while Bell owned 3.1
million. By 1912 there were 3.6 million independent and 5.1 million Bell Stations. The
proportion of independently owned stations decreased progressively thereafter.
Gabel, supra note 104, at 352.
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Telephone Company should be attached to or connected with the
facilities furnished by the telephone company, whether physically, by
induction or otherwise .... 06
The foreign attachments rule was even extended to prohibit the use of
such ancillary items as dial advertising disks10 7 and telephone directory
covers. 08 A third Bell restriction prohibited users from sharing or re-
selling lines leased from the System, thus effectively preventing those
who required only partial use of a line to reduce their costs.
The established carriers maintained incessantly that such tariffs
were essential for the protecting of the quality of the system, for foster-
ing innovation in equipment, and for identifying responsibility in serv-
ice repair and maintenance. Bell's watchword has been "one system, one
policy, universal service."' 0 9 However justifiable these practices may
have been in the "competitive era," they have recently been chal-
lenged by users who seek to both attach and interconnect computers
and private microwave systems to the carrier's dial network. Respond-
ing to these pleas the FCC began a broad public inquiry in 1966 de-
signed to provide the basis for future policy determinations. Before
this administrative decision was tendered, however, the inquiry was
partially eclipsed by prior events."10
The legality of the blanket foreign attachments tariff was first
tested in 1956 by the District of Columbia Circuit in Hush-a-Phone
Corporation v. United States."' The Hush-a-Phone Corporation manu-
factured and sold a rubber cup-like device of the same name, which
snapped onto the telephone mouthpiece and provided privacy of con-
versation. After the sale of over 125,000 such devices, the telephone
companies invoked their foreign attachments tariffs and threatened to
106. Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C. 420, 421 (1968) quoting
Tariff FCC No. 132, filed April 16, 1957. Compare Tariff No. 132 with Tariff No. 263,
effective February 1, 1968, which has an identical provision, appearing in Carter v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C. 420, 427 (1968) app. A.
107. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Dialite Dial Co., 102 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Okla.
1951), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1952).
108. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Miner, 11 Ill. App. 2d 44, 136 N.E.2d 1 (1956)
[Plastic directory book cover held to be a "mechanical apparatus or device" or an "ad-
vertising device" prohibited by the tariff]. But cf. New England Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. National Merchandising Corp., 335 Mass. 658, 141 N.E.2d 702 (1957); National
Merchandising Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 5 N.Y.2d 485, 158 N.E.2d 714, 186
N.Y.S.2d 47 (1959).
109. Baker, supra note 86, at 589 n.112, quoting from FCC, INVESTIGATION OF
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong.
Ist Sess. 145-46 (1939).
110. See pp. 970-78 infra.
111. 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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suspend or terminate service of subscribers who continued to use the
mechanism. 11 2 The FCC concluded that the use of Hush-a-Phones was
"deleterious to the telephone system" and would result in a general
deterioration of the quality of the service.113 The Commission agreed,
however, that if the use of Hush-a-Phones did not in fact impair service,
then a tariff provision barring its use would not be just and reasonable
within the meaning of the Communications Act.114 On appeal, the
circuit court found no such harm to the system and stated:
[T]he intervenors' tariffs . . . are . .. [an] unwarranted interference
with the telephone subscriber's right reasonably to use his telephone
in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly detri-
mental.115
The court remanded the case to the Commission to prescribe the neces-
sary changes in the tariff which would permit the use of Hush-a-Phones.
The Commission's order on remand, in addition to invalidating the car-
rier's foreign attachment regulations insofar as they banned the use of
the Hush-a-Phone device, stated that "an inescapable consequence of
[the] Court's opinion" was to render similar tariff regulations unreason-
able where they served the customer's convenience, without injury to
the telephone companies." 6 Still, the filed tariffs continued in effect
for another dozen years awaiting a further test case.
The foreign attachments restriction was finally resolved in favor
of deletion in the Carterfone confrontation. The Carterfone Corpora-
tion produced a device which automatically switched on a radio trans-
mitter when a telephone caller was speaking, and returned the radio
to the receiving position when the speaker was finished. After the sale of
some 3,500 instruments, the telephone companies announced that the
use of that device in conjunction with the telephone was prohibited
under the foreign attachments tariff. Petitioner Carterfone Corporation
filed a private antitrust suit against the telephone companies to de-
termine the validity of the tariff.117 The court held that the FCC, be-
112. The tariffs gave the carriers authority to remove or disconnect unauthorized
attachments, and to suspend or terminate service during the continued use of said
attachments. It has more recently been held that the public has no unqualified consti-
tutional right to receive telephone service. Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D.
II1. 1969).
113. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 20 F.C.C. 391, 420 (1955).
114. Id.
115. 238 F.2d at 269.
116. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.C.C. 112, 113 (1957).
117. Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.), a1'd,
365 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1966).
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cause of its special competence and expertise in the complex matters
of telephone communication, was vested with primary jurisdiction to
make that decision, and the case was referred to the agency. S
In this adjudicatory proceeding, the Hearing Examiner approved
the Carterfone device for use on the dial telephone network, and or-
dered the carriers to modify their tariffs specifically to allow for its
use." 9 Upon appeal, the full Commission, without a hearing, upheld
this decision but broadened it to include all harmless customer pro-
vided attachments.
In view of the unlawfulness of the tariff there would be no point in
merely declaring it invalid as applied to the Carterfone and permit-
ting it to continue in operation as to other interconnection devices....
The appropriate remedy is to strike the tariff and permit the carriers,
if they so desire, to propose new tariff provisions . . . which will
protect the telephone system against harmful devices. 20
The Hearing Examiner found the tariff unduly discriminatory
under Section 202 (b) of the Communications Act,' 2 ' as the telephone
company permitted the use of its own interconnecting devices while
banning Carterfone's. The Examiner declined to declare the tariff
retroactively unlawful, as the harmless nature of the device was not
known to the carriers. 122 The Commission, however, declared the tariff
unlawful since its inception, effectively piercing the Bell monopoly. In
the future, devices privately beneficial without being publicly detri-
mental would be allowed on the public communications network.
The carriers, smarting from this defeat, but fearful of further
encroachments as a result of the pending inquiry, filed a revised series
of relaxed tariffs, permitting the use of non-harmful foreign attach-
ments and interconnection with private microwave systems to take
effect January 1, 1969. The tariffs still contained some restrictions-
permitting direct electrical connection only through a telephone com-
118. 250 F. Supp. at 192.
119. In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 430, 441 (1967).
120. Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 425-26 (1968). The
Bell and General Systems appealed this decision to the Second Circuit, but this appeal
was later withdrawn when American Tel. & Tel. Co. and Carter settled out of court.
S. MATHISON, supra note 81, at 86-87.
121. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970) states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or un-
reasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations,
facilities or services for or in connection with like communication service ....
122. 13 F.C.C.2d at 441.
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pany supplied protective arrangement, and an insistence that all net-
work control signaling functions still be performed by the carriers.123
In February 1969, AT&T revised its interstate private line tariffs
to permit limited shared use with certain restrictions. Each joint user
was required to possess a terminal station on the shared line with com-
munications to or from such user relating directly to his business.124
The tariffs enumerated the customers which were permitted to share
Telpak lines, while denying this privilege to others. This section of the
tariff has recently been declared unlawfully discriminatory, and the
carriers are in the process of refiling.125
2. The Computer Inquiry. The growing convergence of com-
puters and communications in conjunction with the entry of the com-
mon carriers into the data processing field, triggered a reexamination
of the underlying regulatory premises. The FCC, responding to these
issues, began a public inquiry in 1966126 designed to answer the two
following questions:
(1) Under what circumstances should data processing, com-
puter information and message-switching, or any particu-
lar combination thereof be deemed subject to regula-
tion pursuant to the provisions of the Communications
Act?
(2) Whether the policies and objectives of the Communica-
tions Act will be served better by such regulation or
by such services evolving in a free, competitive market,
and if the latter, whether changes in existing provisions
of law or regulations are needed.127
123. Walker, Mathison & Jones, Data Transmission and the Foreign Attachments
Rule, 15 DATAMiATiON, Feb. 1969, at 60, 63.
124. S. MATHISON at 104-05.
125. For a history of the exhaustive proceedings, see In re Telpak Tariff Sharing
Provisions of American Tel. & Tel. Co. & Western Union Tel. Co., 23 F.C.C.2d 606
(1970), petition for reconsideration denied, 26 F.C.C.2d 862 (1970), rev'd, American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439 (2nd Cir. 1971); Decision and Order on Remand,
31 F.C.C.2d 674 (1971), petition for reconsideration denied, 32 F.C.C.2d 619 (1971),
aff'd sub nom., National Ass'n of Motor Bus Owners v. FCC, 460 F.2d 561 (2d Cir.
1972).
126. In re Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communications Servs. & Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1967).
127. 7 F.C.C.2d at 17-18. A third issue relating to privacy, raised in the original
Notice of Inquiry, was later summarily dismissed with the statement: "The privacy
issue in its broadest sense has numerous social and public policy implications which go
well beyond the pale of our jurisdiction over communications .... " Computer Tenta-
tive Decision, supra note 10, at 294-95.
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It was anticipated that all interested parties would be forthcoming with
data from which the Commission would be able to resolve the issues
intelligently. The FCC received over three thousand pages of corre-
spondence from sorme sixty organizations, and submitted the responses
to the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) for analysis.128 SRI reported
that the economies of scale of carrier-owned computers might justify
their market diversification into teleprocessing. The report concluded
that the Commission should consider postponing any decision'2 9 and
rely on the threat of treble damage antitrust suits as a short-term arbiter
between the regulated and nonregulated firms. An independent study
of communications policies conducted by the President's Task Force
also concluded that Western Union should be permitted to offer tele-
processing services under the assumption that its sagging telegram serv-
ice was hardly in a position for cross-subsidization. 180
The FCC was thus faced with four almost mutually exclusive
policy options:
1. To permit common carriers to offer data processing services with-
out restriction.
2. To permit common carriers to offer data processing services as
a regulated tariffed activity.
3. To permit carriers to offer data processing services only through
a separate subsidiary.
4. To permit carriers to offer data processing services through sepa-
rate subsidiaries which can neither sell services to the parent nor
lease communication channels from the parent.' 31
Option one would permit wholesale carrier entry into teleprocessing,
with the attendant probability of carrier discrimination in the leasing
of communication lines to its data processing competitors. Alterna-
tive two is equally unpalatable, as there is an inherent inequality in
regulating some firms offering a particular service, while leaving un-
regulated others offering the identical service. Option three, while
128. The objectives of the SRI study were twofold: (1) to summarize and
analyze the material submitted to the FCC by industry and government respondents
in the proceeding; and (2) to independently analyze the isssues presented by the inquiry
and to suggest to the FCC its principal alternatives in each case and the probable out-
comes of selecting any particular one. Dunn, supra note 76, at 370.
129. Computer Tentative Decision, at 294-95.
130. TASK FORC REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 6, at 46-47. Western Union's
domestic telegram volume dropped between 1945 and 1964 from 236 million to 93
million, a decrease of 60 percent.
131. S. MATHISON 35-40. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, supra note 59,
at 199-201 for a similar set of proposals.
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eliminating some of the intrinsic dangers of cross-subsidization, never-
theless permits the carrier to establish a vertical integration relation-
ship with its data processing affiliate, much like the Western Electric-
Bell System of today. Such a parent-affiliate relationship has a proclivity
for abuse on many imperceptible levels. 13 2 The fourth choice is the one
most calculated to provide a truly competitive environment, as it es-
sentially eliminates the defects inherent in the other three approaches.
In April of 1970 the FCC had published in the Federal Register a
Tentative Decision and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, essentially
embracing option three.
[T]he Commission is proposing to establish a policy that com-
munications common carriers, subject to our jurisdiction, should not
engage directly in the sale of data processing services, but that such
carriers, other than Bell System Companies, may indirectly engage
in such services through separate corporate entities subject to certain
requirements and safeguards.
133
The safeguards included the maintenance of separate books, personnel,
and facilities between the parent and affiliate organizations, and re-
quired the public filing of all contracts between those concerns."
While noting the innate dangers in such an approach-the alleged
ability of common carriers to favor unjustifiably their own data
processing subsidiaries by discriminatory services, cross-subsidization,
and improper pricing and related anticompetitive practices-the Com-
mission nevertheless felt that "a full and comprehensive review" of
the affiliated organizations would insure "full compliance with the
policies promulgated herein. '"r,
The long awaited Final Decision was released in March of 1971,
with the Commission deviating from its initial approach by adopting
a modified option four alternative. The Commission, in noting that
carrier preferences for affiliates "may be subtle," stated:
132. The third option might prove a workable alternative if the requirement of
competitive bidding was engrafted onto it. The carriers would be required to purchase
the services of the data company offering the lowest price, but meeting specific re-
quirements.
133. Proposed FCC Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 5822 (1970).
134. Id. All carriers with annual operating revenues below $1,000,000 were ex-
empt from these requirements. This cut-off proviso would excuse compliance by approxi-
mately one-half of all independent telephone companies. In re Regulatory & Policy
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & Communications Servs. &
Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 275 n.7 (1971).
135. Proposed FCC Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 5826 (1970). The Commission
asked for comments anew on its Proposed Rules, and received replies from thirty-five
parties, eighteen of whom participated in the oral argument before the Commission.
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[C]arrier[s] shall be prohibited from obtaining any data processing
services from its data affiliate. Carrier-related data entities shall be re-
quired to employ a corporate name or symbol other than that em-
ployed by its carrier affiliate, and such entities are forbidden to pro-
mote their products or services ....
[C]ase by case resolution of problems... is not desirable, ... to
deal with clear-cut, reasonably foreseeable dangers .... 13"
While the Commission did not proscribe carriers from leasing com-
munication lines to their data subsidiaries, this factor could, in fact,
prove insignificant, as the carrier lines are generally of a uniform
quality, and preferential treatment would be difficult to execute.1 3
The Commission, in the promulgation of its program of "maximum
separation," has adhered to a competitive philosophy by allowing all
interested parties to enter the field, permitting the rigors of Adam
Smith's marketplace to determine the survivors.,38 The Final Decision
was a close one, with a forceful dissent, in part, by Chairman Dean
Burch, who disagreed with the majority in denying a common carrier
access to the computer services of its data processing affiliate.
[T]he Commission has ... arbitrarily, without any real showing
of actual or even potential abuse . . . imposed this restriction be-
cause of some vague and unsupported feeling that a common carrier
would not be able to resist the temptation to engage in "improprieties"
in managing its relationship with a data affiliate.
136. 28 F.O.C.2d at 275-76. In denying a petition for reconsideration, the FCC
stated:
[I]f data processing affiliates serve both their related communications companies
and nonrelated companies, they would be in a peculiarly advantageous structural
position to absorb the markets now served by other data processing companies.
With an assured market ... it is reasonable to expect that the data processing
affiliate would gain a competitive advantage over its non-affiliated rivals and the
risk would be that the data processing market would gravitate to communications
data processing affiliates and eventually be "captured" by them.
34 F.C.C.2d 557, 567 (1972).
137. But cf. cases cited note 82 supra.
138. Divestiture is a frequently used method under the Clayton Act to arrest the
trend toward economic concentration. See, e.g., Pfunder, Plaine & Whittenmore, Com-
pliance With Divesture Orders Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of
the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19,54 (1972), stating:
In order for divesture to achieve procompetitive structural relief, the assets to
be divested must comprise an economically viable going concern-that is, the
entity must have the economic capability of surviving and competing effec-
tively in the market. Assets which do not have a profit potential either by
themselves, or in combination with other assets available to the purchaser,
will be unsaleable in the market. They have no economic value, and an order
to divest such assets will provide no structural relief.
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In short, the Commission is here guilty of a classical case of regu-
latory over-kill. 139
The second major thrust of the computer inquiry was to reestab-
lish the boundaries demarcating the communications and data process-
ing industries. As exemplified in the Bunker-Ramo dispute, the ques-
tion was primarily one of determining whether the message-switch-
ing function should be offered exclusively by the regulated common
carriers. Four regulatory alternatives were available to the Commis-
sion:
1. To maintain the status quo, permitting only the common
carriers to offer complete message-switching services.
2. To empower the present communications common carriers
with the sole responsibility for the diverse services which
the new technology has made possible.
3. To allow message-switching to remain essentially a com-
mon carrier activity by permitting other organizations to
offer it, only incidentally to a primary, non-communica-
tions service.
4. To legitimize specialized message-switching services as un-
regulated activities-hence permitting non-carriers to re-
sell communications capacity.140
Option one would freeze the situation, permitting the carriers to ex-
tend their monopoly markets to new areas that might otherwise go
competitive if given the opportunity to develop unhampered by car-
rier domination. Option two would assign all specialized services
created by the new technology to the carrier's exclusive jurisdiction.
Option three embraces the primary business test and is a practical
alternative. If the message-switching function were the salient feature
of the system, then the service would remain a carrier activity, How-
ever, if the message-switching activity were an unessential ingredient
of the offering, then the specialized service bureaus would be free
to employ it. Option four would totally exclude the carriers from
engaging in message-switching, an activity they have been engaged in
for over half a century. Such a proposal is undesirable, as it would
eliminate a unit of competition that is capable, owing to the magni-
139. 28 F.G.C.2d at 289-90.
140. S. MATHISON 52-73.
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tude of AT&T's research budgets, of spurring the market with diverse
new offerings.
With a commendable desire to be intelligible, the Commission
explicitly defined the terms "data processing" and "message-switching,"
and adopted the primary business test rationale of option three.141
Hence, if a hybrid service offered message-switching as a function which
predominated over the data processing portion, it would be within
the carrier's domain and subject to their jurisdiction. Alternatively, if
the message-switching function were only an incidental feature of a
packaged offering that was primarily data processing, there would be
total regulatory forbearance. The Commission, in announcing this
formula, has apparently seized jurisdiction to assert regulatory author-
ity over the data processing services regardless of whether they employ
communication facilities. The Commission has, however, chosen not
to exercise this newly acquired power as evidenced by the following
admonition:
[W]e see no need to assert regulatory authority over data proc-
essing services .... We believe the market for these services will con-
tinue to burgeon and flourish best in the existing competitive en-
vironment.
However, if there should develop significant changes in the struc-
ture of the data processing industry, or if abuses emerge which require
the exercise of corrective action by the Commission, we shall not
hesitate to re-examine the policies set forth herein. 42
The Commission additionally gave AT&T, along with other car-
riers, the green light to engage in specialized services which were only
incidental to data processing. 43 Prior to this decision AT&T had not
entered the field, as it believed itself constrained by the consent de-
cree. 44 The effect of an AT&T entry should not prove especially devas-
tating to the fledgling telecommunications industry, assuming com-
pliance with the guidelines announced above.
The carriers reacted by filing petitions for reconsideration which
were denied in March of 1972,145 exhausting the administrative reme-
141. 28 F.C.C.2d at 277-78.
142. Id. at 298.
143. Id. at 282; Duggan, U.S. Data Processing Subject to Regulation, Rules FCC
as it Gives Partial Green Light to AT&T, 3 LAw & COMPUTER TEcH., Sept. 1970, at
198-202.
144. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
145. 34 F.C.C.2d 557 (1972) (3-2 decision).
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dies. Appeals from the Final Decision by a number of concerns are
presently pending before the Second Circuit.14
6
3. The Specialized Common Carriers. Michigan Senator Philip A.
Hart noted in 1968:
At present there is a vigorous fight by the telephone companies
to protect their rate structure by either stopping parallel systems of
transmission or controlling them.
The trouble is that no one is anxious to take on the arduous, un-
rewarding, politically unwise work of doing what really must be
done .... 147
It may be recalled that the FCC did undertake such "work" in the
Above 890 Decision, which sanctioned private microwave entry, but
denied commercial entities the opportunity to operate relay stations
cooperatively.
In 1964, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) applied to the
Commission for a permit to provide for lease by business and indus-
trial users a system of low-cost, voice and data communication links
between urban centers. The initial proposal was to construct a na-
tional microwave network covering forty-one states and linking one
hundred sixty-five cities.148 The system offered consumers substantial
price reductions, complete flexibility in the use of terminal equipment
and unqualified sharing of lines, but lacked other restrictions which
the carriers normally place over the use of their facilities. For example,
MCI offered to erect a communications system between Chicago and
St. Louis at rate reductions of fifty-four percent over carrier tariffs. The
established carriers forcefully petitioned for dismissal of the license
applications, chiefly stressing the same arguments asserted in the
Above 890 Decision which had proven so successful in the denial of
applications for commercialization of private microwave entities. 14
146. Appeal docketed, No. 71-1300, 2d Cir., Mar. 22, 1971.
147. Hart, The Congressional Perspective Of Competition in the Communica-
tions Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 973, 976-77 (1968).
148. Nolan, supra note 15, at 7.
149. S. MATHISON 188-89 lists them as follows:
[1] Construction of facilities between cities where a carrier system already
exists results in duplication of facilities ....
[2] [Duplication of] systems prevents one carrier from constructing the en-
tire point-to-point capacity at the lowest unit cost and achieving maximum
economies of scale.
[3] The existence of two systems [would entail resort to price cutting, rate wars
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The Hearing Examiner approved a limited MCI application for
eleven stations, connecting Chicago and St. Louis, on the ground that
he found competition in the private line service desirable. 50 The Com-
mission affirmed, stating that the MCI proposal had unique and spe-
cialized characteristics which would meet a significant unfulfilled com-
munication need.'5 ' The Commission commented on the carrier's
petitions:
We believe that MCI's offering would . . . tend to increase
the efficiency of operation of the ... subscribers' businesses ....
In these circumstances we cannot perceive how a grant of the
authorizations requested would pose any serious threat to the estab-
lished carriers' price averaging policies.152
The Commission retained jurisdiction over the proceeding to in-
sure prompt interconnection with the common carrier systems. This
hotly contested decision was categorized as "a radical experiment with
competition" in a concurring opinion.15 While the proceeding was in
progress, a large number of applicants flocked to the Commission with
petitions for the construction of commercial microwave systems. 5 4 In
lieu of considering each application on an ad hoc basis, the Commis-
sion considered the general licensing question in July of 1970 in the
Specialized Common Carrier Services Docket, consolidating a Notice
of Inquiry to formulate policy with the Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing.'r 5 The most active prospective licensees were MCI and Data Trans-
mission Corporation (DATRAN). MCI had seventeen applications
and service suffers].
[4] Cream-skimming of lucrative markets [serving only profitable areas would
upset the nationwide averaging principle].
150. In re Application of Microwave Communications, Inc. for Constr. Permits to
Establish New Facilities In the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv., 18
F.C.C.2d 979, 1005 (1967).
151. 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 959 (1969).
152. Id. at 959-60.
153. Id. at 976.
154. The FCC reported that as of March 15, 1971 there were 33 applicants with
46 separate proposals for 1,877 microwave stations. In re Establishment of Policies &
Procedures for Consideration of Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier
Servs. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. & Proposed Amend-
ments to Parts 21, 43, & 61 of the Comm'n's Rules, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 871 n.1 (1971).
155. In re Establishment of Policies & Procedures for Consideration of Applica-
tion to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Servs. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-
Point Microwave Radio Serv. & Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, & 61 of the
Comm'n's Rules, 24 F.C.C.2d 318 (1970).
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from its associated companies pending before the FCC for segments
of the proposed nationwide network. DATRAN planned to establish
an all digital communications system serving thirty-five cities, and
having two hundred and forty-four microwave stations, on a route
between San Francisco and Boston. The carriers made the traditional
arguments which had failed to persuade the majority in the MCI
Docket. The Commission held:
[C]ompetition in the specialized communications field is reasonably
feasible, there are grounds for a reasonable expectation that new en-
try will have some beneficial effects, and there is no reason to antici-
pate that new entry would have any adverse impact on the service
to the public by existing carriers such as to outweigh the considerations
supporting new entry. We further find and conclude that a general
policy in favor of the entry of new carriers in the specialized com-
munications field would serve the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.'
56
The Commission reasoned that competitive pressures may encourage
some beneficial changes in the Bell System, although only two to four
percent of AT&T's existing total market was vulnerable to competitive
inroads.157 The Commission once again ordered the established carriers,
upon request, to permit interconnection on reasonable terms with the
specialized entities. 58 The FCC, after the above decision, launched a
campaign of liberal licensing for commercial microwave services. In
October of 1971, it approved the application of Interdata Communi-
cations, Inc. for thirteen stations between New York and Washing-
ton, D. C.159 In April of 1972, DATRAN was licensed to construct
sixty-three stations linking Palo Alto, California to Houston, Texas.100
156. 29 F.C.C.2d at 920.
157. Id. at 912. In 1969, when the Bell System bad revenues of $16.1 billion,
data transmission accounted for only $267.5 million, or 1.7 percent of total Bell
revenues. Projected revenues from all MCI carriers will be approximately $55 million
annually. DATRAN's initial investment of $350 million could not -make any significant
inroads on the revenues of a nationwide telephone service with an $8.2 billion invest-
ment program for 1972. The Commission also concluded that Western Union would
not be vulnerable to competition, as that company had $402.4 million gross operating
revenues for 1970. Id. at 892, 912-13.
158. Id. at 940.
159. In re Applications of Interdata Communications, Inc. for Constr. Permits in
the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. for New Stations, 32 F.C.C.2d
36-37 (1971).
160. In re Applications of Data Transmission Co. for Constr. Permits in the
Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv., 34 F.C.C.2d 306 (1972). Here,
the Commission in a terse comment stated that the questions raised concerning the com-
petitive impact of the specialized carriers on the existing telegraph and telephone in-
dustries were now moot. Id. at 307.
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On June 9, 1972, the MCI-New York West Plan was approved for
construction of fifty-three stations between Chicago and New York
City.""' Thus, in scarcely more than a year from the date of the First
Report and Order in the Specialized Common Carrier Services Docket,
a skeletal national system of commercial microwave has emerged.
The carrier response, as might be expected, was vigorous and par-
ticularly aggressive. Bell announced plans to complete construction
of a digital data network for sixty cities by 1975, and estimated that
its existing plant would quadruple by 1980. Western Union was
granted permission to improve its existing microwave service, and to
construct a series of new stations between Cincinnati and Atlanta.
162
Besides these conventional competitive responses, the carriers also
resorted to predatory pricing, a tactic that had proven highly success-
ful in thwarting competition after the Above 890 Decision. In April
of 1972, Western Union filed a tariff revision designed to reduce its
rates for voice and data channels between St. Louis and Chicago to a
level exactly matching those currently being offered by MCI.
63 MCI
petitioned the FCC to reject the Western Union revised tariff sched-
ules, claiming that it was designed to "exclude or limit competition"
in a market in which the Commission had found such competition to
be in the public interest. Western Union countered by alleging that
it was only meeting, and not underpricing, competitive rate estab-
lished by MCI. The Commission held:
[W]here services may be in direct competition, departure from uni-
form nationwide pricing practices may be in order, and in such cir-
cumstances will not be opposed by the Commission.'6
The Agency decided to freeze the situation while it instituted an in-
vestigation and public inquiry to determine the cost and other com-
petitive considerations underlying the new Western Union tariff of-
fering. That decision, however, was not unanimous, and in a stinging
dissent, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson called the Western Union re-
vised rates a "gimmicky manipulation of the Commission's rules" de-
161. In re Applications of MCI-New York West, Inc. for Constr. Permits in the
Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv., 35 F.C.C.2d 98-99 (1972).
162. In re Applications of the Western Union Tel. Co. for Constr. Permits in
the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv., 28 F.C.C.2d 730 (1971).
163. In re The Western Union Tel. Co. Revision of Tariff FCC No. 254, 35
F.C.C.2d 975 (1972). Reduction in charges will be 14 percent to 32 percent of current
rates. Id. at 976.
164. Id. at 978.
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signed to drive out the new microwave competition.0 5 He claimed
that Western Union was the "stalking horse" for the Bell System,
and that once approval was gained for the revised tariff schedule, "the
Commission will be compelled to do for Bell what it has done for
Western Union."'
66
4. The Domestic Satellite Proposal. In September of 1965, the
American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) applied to the FCC for
permission to construct a domestic satellite system for television trans-
mission. The Commission, in rejecting without prejudice the ABC
application, stated that numerous and complex policy determinations
were involved, and simultaneously issued a Notice of Inquiry into the
Domestic Satellite Operations by Nongovernmental Entities.0 7 While
the Inquiry was in progress, President Johnson, in August of 1967,
appointed an independent task force to study communications policy
encompassing the domestic satellite question.
The Commission awaited the Task Force Report which finally be-
came available in December of 1968, recommending the establishment
of a pilot domestic satellite program under the tutelage of COMSAT. 08
The report, however, was never officially released as it was not ac-
ceptable to the newly elected Nixon Administration.0 9 After months
of investigation, the White House finally released a memorandum to
the FCC favoring competition, and stating that there was no public
interest grounds for establishing a monopoly in the domestic satellite
communications field. 7 0
In March of 1970, the Commission concurrently issued a Report
and Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making. In the Report, the
FCC concluded that it possessed jurisdiction under either the Com-
munications Act of 1934 or the Satellite Act of 1962 to regulate do-
mestic satellites.' 7' The Commission authorized the technical filing of
applications by both carrier and non-carrier entities, stating:
The most important value of domestic satellites at the present time
165. Id. at 982.
166. Id.
167. In re Establishment of Domestic Noncommon Carrier Communication Satellite
Facilities by Nongovernmental Entities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970).
168. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 5, at 17-42.
169. Acheson, Domestic Satellite Developments, 11 JURISMETRicS J. 63, 64 (1970).
170. Letter from Peter Flanigan to Dean Burch, Jan. 23, 1970, in 22 F.C.C.2d
125-28 (1970).
171. 22 F.C.C.2d at 128-33. See generally TAsK FORCE REPORT, ch. 5, at 39-42;
Geller, Competition and Monopoly Policies in Domestic Satellite Communications, 13
ANTITRUST BULL. 953, 958-59 (1968).
COMMENTS
appears to lie in their potential for opening new markets, for expand-
ing the beneficial role of competition in the existing markets for
specialized communication services, and for developing new and dif-
ferentiated services that reflect the special characteristics of the
satellite technology.17 2
The Notice of Proposed Rule Making requested all interested parties
to submit comments on two cardinal questions:
1. What policies should govern in the event of technical or economical
conflicts among the applications;
2. Whether AT&T should be limited to satellite facilities for public
message service or limited to leasing satellite channels from others,
or limited in neither respect.'
7 3
The Proposed Second Report and Order, prepared by the Chief
of the Common Carrier Bureau and based on comments received from
the eight applicants and others, was released in March of 1972. This
Report recommended that all applicants found qualified and proposing
similar satellite technology should be required to consolidate their
efforts in a partner-type relationship. 74 The staff felt that this grouping
of applicants would reduce the required investment and overhead
while leaving each entirely free to innovate. As to the second issue,
they believe that the unrestricted entry by AT&T would result in its
monopolization of the field.
AT&T's early participation, via satellite facilities, in the com-
petitive markets for specialized services could well result in its pre-
emption of that market to an extent that would make it economically
impractical for other entities to become established. The construction
and operartion of satellite systems require substantial fixed investments
and risks. With AT&T's vast economic resources and its ability to load
a satellite system with message toll traffic from its monopoly market
almost immediately, AT&T will have a distinct advantage over po-
tential competitors who are attempting entry with no established base
of communication revenues from monopoly markets. Under these
circumstances, the prospect of market preemption by AT&T poses a
real deterrent to the entry or viable operation by others in the field
of satellite services.17
5
The staff recommended that AT&T should, at least in the initial stages,
be limited in its utilization of the satellite facilities "to those of its
172. 22 F.C.C.2d at 95.
173. Proposed FCC Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 5351 (1970).
174. 34 F.C.C.2d at 38.
175. Id. at 52.
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services that are essentially monopoly services," such as its message toll
or WATS offerings. 1 76 As to the Western Union Telegraph Co., the
Second Report surveyed the plight of the anemic telegraph message
service and stated that this factor should be considered relevant as to
whether Western Union would be afforded the same opportunity as
other carriers engaged in specialized communications services-to own
domestic satellite facilities. The Commission's Final Decision is ex-
pected to adopt the staff recommendations.
V. CONCLUSION
During the past dozen years, the pace of technological change has
prompted the FCC to reevaluate the natural monopoly thesis as ap-
plied not only to the traditional areas where it was prevalent, but to
many new services brought about by the rapid confluence of com-
puters and communications. The agency, through a series of aggres-
sive decisions, has injected a competitive serum which has a promise
of treating, if not curing, the regulatory ills plaguing the telecom-
munications industry. In essence, the Commission has attempted to
quarantine the contagious "natural monopoly microbes" to areas where
the economies of scale have been proven to be truly outstanding,
thereby formulating a viable national policy of competition in the
burgeoning computer-communications field. The short-lived "old com-
petition" was evidenced in the Above 890 Decision, where the Com-
mission permitted the unrestricted licensing of private microwave fa-
cilities which were in direct competition with the established common
carriers. The "new competition" witnessed a change in agency attitude
towards the scope of the competition authorized and in regard to its
policy on interconnection. In the Carterfone Decision, the FCC held
the blanket foreign attachments rule invalid, and permitted com-
mercial users to attach their own devices to carrier communications
lines, provided they were not harmful to system integrity. The full
impact of this decision is as yet uncertain, and the question remains
whether it will have application to residential users as well. In the
Computer Inquiry, the agency restricted the large-scale entry of the
traditional carriers into the field by requiring them to offer data serv-
ices only through an independent affiliate, which would be prohibited
from selling its services to the parent firm. This policy coerced the
176. Id. at 53.
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carriers into purchasing data services from their competitors, namely
the computer hardware manufacturers and service bureau organiza-
tions, hence insuring the latter's continuing prosperity. In the Spe-
cialized Carrier Services Docket, the Commission approved the licens-
ing of rival intercity microwave systems, which offer both voice and
data communications channels for hire to the public, despite the ob-
jections of the common carriers. The agency, furthermore, required
the established carriers to interconnect with these fledgling systems
upon request, thereby ensuring their survival. Still the FCC must en-
deavor to establish effective regulatory standards to govern common
carrier minimum rates. Absent this, the latter's predatory pricing
responses might frustrate the agency's competitive reformation by
uneconomically foreclosing entry of otherwise efficient competitors. As
the Commission's "new competition" has proven much more resource-
ful than the old, it is reasonable to believe that such an order might
be forthcoming in the recently announced inquiry on the revised
Western Union Tariffs.17 In the Second Report and Order on Domestic
Satellites, the FCC explicitly rejected the natural monopoly thesis by
confining ATgcT's entry into the field to its traditional telephone serv-
ices. The Report, in requiring the pooling of firms proposing similar
technological plans, in effect has made possible entry by some firms
which could not otherwise afford the venture.
The overall effectiveness of the FCC as a regulatory agency has
recently been acknowledged in a report by the President's Advisory
Council on Executive Reorganization. 178 The Council, after making
an intensive agency study, recommended far-reaching changes in the
structure and regulatory responsibilities of six organizations, but only
a reduction in size of the FCC from seven to five members.
The Commission's new competitive perspective has ostensibly been
made possible by a flexible interpretation of its powers and functions
under the Communications Act. The Agency and numerous courts
have repeatedly stated that inasmuch as Congress, in passing the
Communications Act of 1934, could not have possibly foreseen the
177. TASK FORCE REPORT, ch. 6, at 19. But cf. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1970) ; Klein, Meeting Competition by Price Systems Under Section 2(b) of
the Robinson-Patman Act: Problems and Prospects, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 213 (1971).
The seller is accorded a complete defense for price concessions made in good faith to
meet the equally low price of a competitor, irrespective of whether injury occurs.
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NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES 115-18 (1971) (commonly called The Ash Council Report).
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dynamic developments that have come into existence in the telecom-
munications field during the last several decades, the FCC was en-
trusted with a "comprehensive mandate," and possessed expansive
powers in coping with new developments in the industry.7 0 This con-
cept of the "living" Communications Act has enabled the agency to
regulate such recent developments as domestic satellites, and has per-
mitted it to forge a competitive reformation in related fields. It can be
anticipated that any new service which might be authorized in the fu-
ture will also be thrown open to the "new competition." A recent Fifth
Circuit decision has held that not only is the Commission permitted
to consider the anticompetitive potential of activities which fall within
its jurisdiction, but that in certain instances it is required to consider
them, and that such antitrust factors may be the sole basis for an
agency decision. °80 This view seems clearly inconsistent with the twenty-
year old Supreme Court decision, FCC v. RCA Communications,
Inc.,81 which held that there was no national policy "unqualifiedly"
favoring competition in the coihmunications industry, and that com-
petition per se was not to be "the single or controlling reliance for
safeguarding the public interest.' 8 2 The Court went on to state that
competition could be considered by the Commission in arriving at its
communications policy, provided that it made a finding, supported
by the record, that competition would serve some beneficial purpose.1 8
While the fate of the Commission's competitive reformation may ulti-
mately reside in the Supreme Court, it must be realized that the
case was decided in an era when the natural monopoly rationale was
pervasive, and is long overdue for reevaluation. 8 4
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